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shadowen On March 22, 2024




Bunyip Bend, Australia
#91New Post! Oct 30, 2017 @ 09:54:45
On October 31, 1917 men of the 4th and 12th Australian Light Horse Regiments charged the vital Turkish positions at Beersheba in what is regarded as the last successful large scale Calvary charge in history...

The village of BIR SABA lay on the northern edge of the Sinai Desert in a shallow saucer at the foot of the judean Hills. Beerhseba was protected by Tel El Saba, a 300 metre feature on the northern bank of the Wadi Saba 3 kilometres to the east. It was a great mound which had a commanding view of the surrounding plain. The Wadi ran across the south of the town from east to west.

The enemy was Turkey, Imperial Germany's eastern ally. They held the line, Gaza-Beersheba. At Beersheba were the 27th Division and Battalions from the 16th and 24th Divisions, supported by artillery. The enemy's defence extended from Tel El Saba on the eastern flank. Two lines of trenches were dug into the cliff face of the Tel. A series of inferior trenches extended along the Wadi; they were not protected by wire. These extended to a group of detached trenches on the south-west flank. The enemy had good zones of fire.

Lt-Gen Sir Harry Chauvel commanded the Desert Mounted Corps. Chauvel's orders were to straddle the Beersheba-Hebron Road at Sakati 8 kilometres north-east of Beersheba, capture Tel El Saba, then storm the town. The mission was to be executed on the first day of the battle.

He had two divisions, each of three brigades. The ANZAC Mounted Division (ANZACs) included the 1st and 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigades and the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade. The Australian Mounted Division included the 3rd and 4th Austrlian Light Horse Brigades and the 5th (British) Yeomanry Brigade. In support were the Light Batteries of the Royal Horse Artillery.

The Battle of Beersheba was to be a three-phase operation supported by the British. The first phase was to be a night ride from wells at Asluj and Khalasa 20 kilometres to the south in the Sinai, to positions south and south-east of the town. In the second phase, the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade was to advance to Sakati and act as a cut-off force. The 1st Australian Light Horse and New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigades were to capture Tel El Saba. Finally, with the road and Tel secure, the ANZAC's were to storm the town. This did not eventuate. This was the most significant factor in the Battle of Beersheba, forcing Chauvel to commit his reserve - the Australian Mounted Division. In a preliminary operation, the British Infantry of XX Corps were to secure positions to the south-west astride the Khalasa-Beersheba Road.

At Asluj and Khalasa the men of the Desert Mounted Corps watered; they carried three days rations. Despite great loads, the horses were touched with excitement. Smoking was forbidden and talking subdued. The bare hills of Sinai sounded with the beat of thousands of shod horses. They rode 30 kilometres through the night.

30th October 1917
1800: Asluj and Khalasa were cleared.

31st October 1917
0555: 100 British guns opened in support of the preliminary operation.

0700: The Desert Mounted Corps halted, and patrols were pushed forward. Beersheba with its mosque was clearly in view; it offered no prize in rations or quarters, but something more coveted were the ancient wells to water those parched men and their Waler mounts. A large pool could be seen shimmering in the Wadi; there had been a storm on the 27th.

0830: The British rushed forward and captured their objectives to the south-west and brought forward their guns.

0900: The ANZAC's were ready to seize the road and the Tel. The enemy was observed reinforcing the Tel.

0930: The 2nd Brigade moved into artillery formation, advanced through a Bedouin camp, and thundered to the Hebron Road Sakati without slackening. Turkish batteries fired, but formation and ground gave them protection. With this task accomplished, they remained in a Wadi for the day.

1000: The Somerset Battery opened up on Tel El Saba from 3000 metres to cover the ANZAC assault. The 3rd Australian Light Horse Regiment was ordered to attack from the south-east. A spirited gallop under heavy fire brought the 3rd to within 1500 metres of the enemy. They dismounted. The Auckland Regiment conformed to the north. The Inverness Battery gave covering fire to the Somersets as they galloped to within 1000 metres of the Tel. The ANZAC's were severely punished but they continued their advance, eventually bringing effective Hotchkiss fire onto the cliff.

1300: The 2nd Australian Light Horse Regiment was ordered to support the 3rd. They advanced at the gallop, dismounted and rushed their horses back so quickly that the enemy thought they had retreated. They fired on the horses; this enabled the 2nd to advance unharmed. Meanwhile, the 3rd had gained the bank.

1500: The 3rd continued. Some Turks surrendered; others fled into the town. The 2nd and 3rd gave chase then fought off a counter-attack. At last the ANZAC's had secured the Hebron Road and Tel El Saba.

1430: With the day on the wane, it was now neck or nothing; the time had come to commit the reserve. Chauvel issued decisive orders for the occupation of Beersheba. Brig. Grant of the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade was orered to lead the charge.

1630: The 4th and 12th Australian Light Horse Regiments drew up behind a ridge. From the crest, Beerhseba was in full view. The course lay down a long, slight slope which was bare of cover. Between them and the town lay the enemy defences. The 4th was on the right; the 12th was on the left. They rode with bayonets in hand. Each drew up on a squadron frontage. Every man knew that only a wild, desperate charge could seize Beerhseba before dark. They moved off at the trot, deploying at once into artillery formation, with 5 metres between horsemen. Almost at once the pace quickened to a gallop. Once direction was given, the lead squadrons pressed forward. The 11th Australian Light Horse Regiment and the Yeomanry followed at the trot in reserve. The Turks opened fire with shrapnel. Machine guns fired against the lead squadrons. The Royal Horse Artillery got their range and soon had them out of action. The Turkish riflemen fired, horses were hit, but the charge was not checked. The Lighthorsemen drove in their spurs. The bewildered enemy failed to adjust their sights and soon their fire was passing harmlessly overhead. The 4th took the trenches; the enemy soon surrendered. The 12th rode through a gap and on into the town. Their was a bitter fight. Some enemy surrendered; others fled and were pursued into the Judean Hills. In less than an hour it was over; the enemy was finally beaten.

From his headquarters, Chauvel had watched the battle develop. He saw the New Zealanders swarming the Tel; on their right the 9th and 10th LH Regiment were trotting in pursuit under shrapnel. On the Wadi the 2nd and 3rd LH Regiments were pressing forward in their attempt to take the town from the east. The Royal Horse Artillery were firing in support. Then over the ridge rode the 4th and 12th . . . shrapnel . . . the signal to charge! Not for almost an hour did Chauvel learn that Beersheba had been won.

For days, the charge was the talk of the camps and messes.
The Australian Light Horse had galloped into history.
shadowen On March 22, 2024




Bunyip Bend, Australia
#92New Post! Oct 30, 2017 @ 09:59:50
BEERSHEBA

The charge of the 4th Australian Light Horse at Beersheba late in the afternoon of 31 October 1917, is remembered as history's last great cavalry charge...

The assault on Beersheba began at dawn with the infantry divisions of the British XX Corps attacking from the south and south-west. Despite artillery and air support, neither the infantry attacks from the south, or the Anzac Mounted Division’s attack from the east had succeeded in capturing Beersheba by mid-afternoon.

With time running out for the Australians to capture Beersheba and its wells before dark, Lieutenant General Harry Chauvel, the Australian commander of the Desert Mounted Corps, ordered Brigadier General William Grant, commanding the 4th Light Horse Brigade, to make a mounted attack directly towards the town. Chauvel knew, from aerial photographs, that the Turkish trenches in front of the town were not protected by barbed wire. However, German bombing had forced the 4th Brigade into a scattered formation and it was not until 1650 hrs that they were in position. The Brigade assembled behind rising ground 6 kilometres south-east of Beersheba with the 4th Light Horse Regiment on the right, the 12th Light Horse Regiment on the left and the 11th Light Horse Regiment in reserve.

The Australian Light Horse was to be used purely as cavalry for the first time. Although they were not equipped with cavalry sabres, the Turks who faced the long bayonets held by the Australians did not consider there was much difference between a charge by cavalry and a charge by mounted infantry. The Light Horse moved off at the trot, and almost at once quickened to a gallop. As they came over the top of the ridge and looked down the long, gentle open slope to Beersheba, they were seen by the Turkish gunners, who opened fire with shrapnel. But the pace was too fast for the gunners. After three kilometres Turkish machine-guns opened fire from the flank, but they were detected and silenced by British artillery. The rifle fire from the Turkish trenches was wild and high as the Light Horse approached. The front trench and the main trench were jumped and some men dismounted and then attacked the Turks with rifle and bayonet from the rear. Some galloped ahead to seize the rear trenches, while other squadrons galloped straight into Beersheba.

Nearly all the wells of Beersheba were intact and further water was available from a storm that had filled the pools. The 4th and 12th Light Horse casualties were thirty-one killed and thirty-six wounded; they captured some 1,500 men. The capture of Beersheba meant that the Gaza-Beersheba line was turned. Gaza fell a week later and on 9 December 1917, the British troops entered Jerusalem.
shadowen On March 22, 2024




Bunyip Bend, Australia
#93New Post! Oct 30, 2017 @ 10:12:06
BEERSHEBA

The 4th and 12th Light Horse Brigades had ridden through the desert all night, bridles and stirrups muffled to silence their advance. The dust was so thick that even in daylight the troopers - all volunteers, all young men from NSW and Victoria - couldn’t see past their horse’s heads.

It was October 31, 1917, and they were about to make an extraordinary attempt on the fortified desert town of Beersheba, in what is now Israel.

Their commanders planned an audacious surprise attack on the strategically significant town, which was held by the Turks and was the only source of water in the region.

If they didn’t prevail, the Australian men and their horses - who had already gone two days without water - faced dying of thirst, if they weren’t captured by the enemy.

The Battle of Beersheba is remembered for the extraordinary and victorious cavalry charge of the Australian horsemen from the desert through Turkish artillery fire and over the enemy’s trenches.

The town was protected by a system of trenches, but there was no barbed wire on the east side, reflecting the Turks’ belief that no enemy would approach through the desert. They were wrong.

The light horsemen began the charge more than six kilometres from the town, accelerating to full gallop over two kilometres out. The riders were armed not with swords, but with bayonets.

Artillery shells landed around them as they rode, recorded Ion 'Jack' Idriess, a 5th brigade trooper from the Sydney suburb of Waverley who witnessed the charge through binoculars and later became a prolific writer.

“We laughed with delight when the shells burst behind our men as Turkish gunners wild with fear forgot to lower their sights", he wrote.

"Captured Turkish officers told us they never dreamed that mounted troops would be madmen enough to attempt rushing infantry redoubts protected by roaring machine guns and artillery. Yet they just galloped on, their thousand hooves stuttering, coming at a rate that frightened a man – an awe-inspiring sight galloping through red haze – knee to knee – horse to horse – the dying sun glinting on bayonet points".

It was the brigade’s commander General William Grant’s decision to order the light horsemen to charge cavalry style when they usually would have ridden almost to the frontline and then dismounted to fight hand to hand.

Instead, the 800 horsemen charged out of the desert…and just leapt over the trenches straight into Beersheba town, captured the water wells and all of the town. It was history's last major cavalry charge.

The Turkish garrison at Beersheba had 28 artillery guns, nine machine guns, two aircraft and 4400 men. The Australians killed 500 hundred Turks and took 1,500 prisoner, while only losing 31 of their own troopers and 70 horses. It was a stunning victory.

The campaign worked because of the shock value, and the sheer speed of the light horsemen’s approach on the town.

The battle was a turning point in the Palestine campaign of World War I, fought between British Empire forces and the Ottoman and German empires’ forces for control of the region, which was considered of great strategic importance because of the Suez Canal which linked the Red Sea with the Mediterranean.
shadowen On March 22, 2024




Bunyip Bend, Australia
#94New Post! Nov 20, 2017 @ 08:58:56
The Battle of Cambrai

Fought between 20 November and 7 December 1917, was the first battle in history involving the employment of tanks en masse. After a series of failures, largely due to the impassibility of the mud, during the Ypres offensives the proponents of the tank were keen to prove its worth my mounting a massed raid on the German line west of Cambrai in northern France. This raid evolved into a full scale attack employing six infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions, over 1000 guns and 476 tanks, which was launched at dawn on 20 November.

The initial assault was a spectacular success, demonstrating the power of the tank when employed in a shock role, and ripped a hole almost ten kilometres wide and six kilometres deep in the German line. Mechanical failures among the tanks, the deployment of German reserves, and the obstacle presented by the St. Quentin Canal sapped the attack of its momentum after the first day. The fighting swayed to and fro for the next nine days, with the British unable to capitalize on their early gains and the Germans unable to force them back to any extent. On 30 November, however, the Germans launched a counterattack employing twenty divisions.

By 7 December, they had recaptured all of the ground lost since 20 November. The operation cost approximately 45,000 British, and 50,000 German dead and wounded.
shadowen On March 22, 2024




Bunyip Bend, Australia
#95New Post! Sep 04, 2018 @ 09:19:38
August 8, 1918 - The Beginning of the End
"the black day of the German Army".
- Erich Ludendorff in describing the first day of the battle of Amiens.

Corporal Walter Downing of the 57th Battalion was among the thousands of Australian troops laying out in position near the town of Villers-Bretonneux in France in the early hours of Aug­ust 8, 1918. At precisely 0420hrs, the fire of hundreds of artillery guns erupted in unison, shattering the silent hours before daybreak.

“It was as though a flaming dawn had been flung into the sky,” he said. “The whole world flared behind us … white smoke curled over us and hid the flaming skies.”

The bombardment screened the assaulting waves of infantrymen from the 2nd Australian Division as they went into action, blanketed by thick fog. “There was a thrumming as of gigantic bumble bees, and low chug-chug-chug, as the ugly noses of the tanks poked through the mist above us … Then a rattling of machineguns told us that the lads in front were at grips with the enemy.”

Downing was a participant in and witness to one of the most significant actions fought by British and dominion forces on the Western Front. In a matter of hours Australian, Canadian, British and French troops advanced with hundreds of tanks. Supported by aircraft and an enormous amount of firepower they tore a gaping hole in the German Army’s defences south of the Somme River.

The Australians and Canadians advanced 12km into German-occupied territory, ― the longest single advance achieved on the Western Front in one day.

Those who followed in the wake of the assaulting infantry were stunned to see horse-drawn field artillery galloping into action, and cooks from battalion transport sections boiling the pot on field cookers as they shuffled forward into enemy territory.

By 1300hrs, all four Australian divisions involved in the fighting had taken their objectives in an attack described by one of its commanders as “the most bloodless ever made by Australian infantry in a great battle”. For the loss of 2000 dead and wounded (heavy enough in human misery but astonishingly light given the number of troops involved) the Australian Corps under the command of Lieutenant General Sir John Mon­ash succeeded in capturing 7200 prisoners, 173 field and heavy guns (including a large 28cm rail gun that lobbed 240kg shells 20km into Allied territory) and enough engineering material to sustain it for the rest of the war. It was a watershed moment in the fighting on the Western Front. German general Erich Ludendorff described August 8, 1918, as “the black day of the German Army”.

What made the battle of Amiens such a resounding success was the important tactical lessons that had been demonstrated weeks earlier. On July 4, Australian troops under Mon­ash’s command carried out a successful attack at the village of Le Hamel in an effort to straighten a bend in the Australian Corps front. The Allies knew the morale of the German troops opposite them was low and their defences were incredibly poor, and the Hamel battle plan stressed the element of surprise and a ground attack with clearly defined objectives 2km away.

With infantry, tanks, aircraft and an enormous amount of artillery at his disposal, Monash had the good fortune of commanding a recognisably integrated weapons system that characterised much of the fighting in the final months of the war. He famously likened this all-arms battle to a symphony, with himself as conductor: “A perfect modern battle plan is nothing so much as a score for an orchestral composition, where the various arms and units are the instruments, and the tasks they perform are their respectful musical phrases. Every individual unit must take its entry precisely at the proper moment, and play its phrase in the general harmony.”

Monash planned the operation fastidiously, holding lengthy conferences in which the commanders and experts whose units were involved were encouraged to pool ideas so potential problems could be foreseen and solutions considered.

The Germans defending positions at Hamel were caught completely by surprise, and assaulting units were on their objectives within a mere 93 minutes. Hamel was a practical demonstration of the benefits of assaulting German positions using combined arms tactics — a success Monash attributed to the “perfection of teamwork” — but its scale paled in comparison to what was achieved on Aug­ust 8, 1918. Hamel was an attack along a 6km front, involving about 7000 Australian infantry, 60 British tanks, 639 artillery pieces and more 230 predominantly British aircraft.

The battle of Amiens, however, involved more than 100,000 infantrymen, 552 tanks (every tank available to the British Army), 782 aircraft and 1236 guns firing somewhere in the region of 350,000 shells across a 20km front. Under-strength and unable to resist such a ferocious arsenal of weaponry, the demoralised Germans south of the Somme River were at a huge disadvantage when faced by Australian and Canadian infantry coming at them through the fog supported by tanks. Downing described how “whenever we found ourselves in trouble we signalled to the tanks, and they turned on the obstacle. Then punk-crash, punk-crash! … Another German post was blown to pieces.”

Monash repeatedly insisted to General Sir Henry Rawlinson, the commander of British Fourth Army, the necessity of carrying out a combined arms attack on a much larger scale, since Australian patrols carried out after Hamel confirmed that the German forma­tions opposite them had done nothing to strengthen their def­ences in the area. If the front held by the Australians could be reduced, and with support from the Canadians on their right, Monash was sure he could exploit the situation in the area and achieve a stunning breakthrough.

Monash was the prime mover behind Fourth Army’s victory of August 8, 1918, and there is no doubt the battle plan for Amiens was Hamel on a much larger scale.

An important aspect of Monash’s battle planning for August 8 was setting limited objectives so his troops did not advance beyond their protective artillery screen. This involved a complex leapfrogging manoeuvre; infantry and field artillery of the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions would pass through ground captured by the 3rd and 2nd Australian divisions, which had instructions to dig in after securing their assigned objectives.

Seeing the Australians were ascendant in the Hamel area, and that the terrain was suited for tanks, Rawlinson resurrected plans for a major attack south of the Somme River that would become the battle of Amiens. The broader strategic vision of Allied commanders involved the French striking on the Marne and the British leading the combined Anglo-French attack east of Amiens. Rawlinson’s Fourth Army would attack along a 20km front, with the Australians and Canadians attacking south of the Somme River with flanking support from the British and the French.

Their success was the right cross of a devastating one-two combination that sent the German Army staggering backwards on its heels. The battle of Amiens heralded the start of what has become known as the Hundred Days offensive — a confounding series of British and French attacks that drove the German Army back to its last defensive positions on the Western Front. As part of British Fourth Army, Monash led the Australian Corps through its most successful actions of the war, which included the capture of Mont St Quentin and Peronne, and breaching the Hindenburg Line at Bellenglise. But victory came at a heavy price, with the Australian Corps suffering 35,000 casualties under Monash in the four months between Hamel and the last Australian infantry action of the war at Montbrehain on October 5, 1918. After five months of hard fighting without relief, the Australian Corps was resting when the Armistice was signed on November 11, signifying imperial Germany’s formal defeat and an end to four years of slaughter. By then the Australian Imperial Force had suffered more than 179,530 battle casualties fighting in France and Belgium, which included 45,000 dead.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Downing went into action on August 8 with other units of the 5th Australian Division, leapfrogging other Australian units to capture the eastern side of the village of Harbonnieres. Troops of the 1st Australian Division passed through their position later that afternoon to assault the town of Lihons. Downing recalled seeing them in the distance, advancing towards the next line of German positions in short rushes with rifles and bayonet. The war was no longer a stalemate, fought from muddy trenches relentlessly shelled by German artillery, but was now a war of movement, fought through fields of wheat and corn with an impressive arsenal of supporting weaponry. The rattle of rifle fire echoed beyond the next ridgeline. “Batches of prisoners shambled through. Motor ambulances rolled along the road by our trench as the sun was setting. A frog croaked from a weedy ditch. A bird began its song.”
newcarscent7 On March 18, 2020




Cleveland, Ohio
#96New Post! Sep 04, 2018 @ 13:30:53
It was the only war that was so full of itself, it claimed all wars prior were inferior!
chaski On April 19, 2024
Stalker





Tree at Floydgirrl's Window,
#97New Post! Sep 04, 2018 @ 17:42:06
@newcarscent7 Said

It was the only war that was so full of itself, it claimed all wars prior were inferior!



GREATEST WAR EVER!
Ghyda On February 11, 2020




Anaheim, California
#98New Post! Sep 04, 2018 @ 18:56:26
@shadowen Said

August 8, 1918 - The Beginning of the End
"the black day of the German Army".
- Erich Ludendorff in describing the first day of the battle of Amiens.

Corporal Walter Downing of the 57th Battalion was among the thousands of Australian troops laying out in position near the town of Villers-Bretonneux in France in the early hours of Aug­ust 8, 1918. At precisely 0420hrs, the fire of hundreds of artillery guns erupted in unison, shattering the silent hours before daybreak.

“It was as though a flaming dawn had been flung into the sky,” he said. “The whole world flared behind us … white smoke curled over us and hid the flaming skies.”

The bombardment screened the assaulting waves of infantrymen from the 2nd Australian Division as they went into action, blanketed by thick fog. “There was a thrumming as of gigantic bumble bees, and low chug-chug-chug, as the ugly noses of the tanks poked through the mist above us … Then a rattling of machineguns told us that the lads in front were at grips with the enemy.”

Downing was a participant in and witness to one of the most significant actions fought by British and dominion forces on the Western Front. In a matter of hours Australian, Canadian, British and French troops advanced with hundreds of tanks. Supported by aircraft and an enormous amount of firepower they tore a gaping hole in the German Army’s defences south of the Somme River.

The Australians and Canadians advanced 12km into German-occupied territory, ― the longest single advance achieved on the Western Front in one day.

Those who followed in the wake of the assaulting infantry were stunned to see horse-drawn field artillery galloping into action, and cooks from battalion transport sections boiling the pot on field cookers as they shuffled forward into enemy territory.

By 1300hrs, all four Australian divisions involved in the fighting had taken their objectives in an attack described by one of its commanders as “the most bloodless ever made by Australian infantry in a great battle”. For the loss of 2000 dead and wounded (heavy enough in human misery but astonishingly light given the number of troops involved) the Australian Corps under the command of Lieutenant General Sir John Mon­ash succeeded in capturing 7200 prisoners, 173 field and heavy guns (including a large 28cm rail gun that lobbed 240kg shells 20km into Allied territory) and enough engineering material to sustain it for the rest of the war. It was a watershed moment in the fighting on the Western Front. German general Erich Ludendorff described August 8, 1918, as “the black day of the German Army”.

What made the battle of Amiens such a resounding success was the important tactical lessons that had been demonstrated weeks earlier. On July 4, Australian troops under Mon­ash’s command carried out a successful attack at the village of Le Hamel in an effort to straighten a bend in the Australian Corps front. The Allies knew the morale of the German troops opposite them was low and their defences were incredibly poor, and the Hamel battle plan stressed the element of surprise and a ground attack with clearly defined objectives 2km away.

With infantry, tanks, aircraft and an enormous amount of artillery at his disposal, Monash had the good fortune of commanding a recognisably integrated weapons system that characterised much of the fighting in the final months of the war. He famously likened this all-arms battle to a symphony, with himself as conductor: “A perfect modern battle plan is nothing so much as a score for an orchestral composition, where the various arms and units are the instruments, and the tasks they perform are their respectful musical phrases. Every individual unit must take its entry precisely at the proper moment, and play its phrase in the general harmony.”

Monash planned the operation fastidiously, holding lengthy conferences in which the commanders and experts whose units were involved were encouraged to pool ideas so potential problems could be foreseen and solutions considered.

The Germans defending positions at Hamel were caught completely by surprise, and assaulting units were on their objectives within a mere 93 minutes. Hamel was a practical demonstration of the benefits of assaulting German positions using combined arms tactics — a success Monash attributed to the “perfection of teamwork” — but its scale paled in comparison to what was achieved on Aug­ust 8, 1918. Hamel was an attack along a 6km front, involving about 7000 Australian infantry, 60 British tanks, 639 artillery pieces and more 230 predominantly British aircraft.

The battle of Amiens, however, involved more than 100,000 infantrymen, 552 tanks (every tank available to the British Army), 782 aircraft and 1236 guns firing somewhere in the region of 350,000 shells across a 20km front. Under-strength and unable to resist such a ferocious arsenal of weaponry, the demoralised Germans south of the Somme River were at a huge disadvantage when faced by Australian and Canadian infantry coming at them through the fog supported by tanks. Downing described how “whenever we found ourselves in trouble we signalled to the tanks, and they turned on the obstacle. Then punk-crash, punk-crash! … Another German post was blown to pieces.”

Monash repeatedly insisted to General Sir Henry Rawlinson, the commander of British Fourth Army, the necessity of carrying out a combined arms attack on a much larger scale, since Australian patrols carried out after Hamel confirmed that the German forma­tions opposite them had done nothing to strengthen their def­ences in the area. If the front held by the Australians could be reduced, and with support from the Canadians on their right, Monash was sure he could exploit the situation in the area and achieve a stunning breakthrough.

Monash was the prime mover behind Fourth Army’s victory of August 8, 1918, and there is no doubt the battle plan for Amiens was Hamel on a much larger scale.

An important aspect of Monash’s battle planning for August 8 was setting limited objectives so his troops did not advance beyond their protective artillery screen. This involved a complex leapfrogging manoeuvre; infantry and field artillery of the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions would pass through ground captured by the 3rd and 2nd Australian divisions, which had instructions to dig in after securing their assigned objectives.

Seeing the Australians were ascendant in the Hamel area, and that the terrain was suited for tanks, Rawlinson resurrected plans for a major attack south of the Somme River that would become the battle of Amiens. The broader strategic vision of Allied commanders involved the French striking on the Marne and the British leading the combined Anglo-French attack east of Amiens. Rawlinson’s Fourth Army would attack along a 20km front, with the Australians and Canadians attacking south of the Somme River with flanking support from the British and the French.

Their success was the right cross of a devastating one-two combination that sent the German Army staggering backwards on its heels. The battle of Amiens heralded the start of what has become known as the Hundred Days offensive — a confounding series of British and French attacks that drove the German Army back to its last defensive positions on the Western Front. As part of British Fourth Army, Monash led the Australian Corps through its most successful actions of the war, which included the capture of Mont St Quentin and Peronne, and breaching the Hindenburg Line at Bellenglise. But victory came at a heavy price, with the Australian Corps suffering 35,000 casualties under Monash in the four months between Hamel and the last Australian infantry action of the war at Montbrehain on October 5, 1918. After five months of hard fighting without relief, the Australian Corps was resting when the Armistice was signed on November 11, signifying imperial Germany’s formal defeat and an end to four years of slaughter. By then the Australian Imperial Force had suffered more than 179,530 battle casualties fighting in France and Belgium, which included 45,000 dead.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Downing went into action on August 8 with other units of the 5th Australian Division, leapfrogging other Australian units to capture the eastern side of the village of Harbonnieres. Troops of the 1st Australian Division passed through their position later that afternoon to assault the town of Lihons. Downing recalled seeing them in the distance, advancing towards the next line of German positions in short rushes with rifles and bayonet. The war was no longer a stalemate, fought from muddy trenches relentlessly shelled by German artillery, but was now a war of movement, fought through fields of wheat and corn with an impressive arsenal of supporting weaponry. The rattle of rifle fire echoed beyond the next ridgeline. “Batches of prisoners shambled through. Motor ambulances rolled along the road by our trench as the sun was setting. A frog croaked from a weedy ditch. A bird began its song.”


A man I know says that he commanded a tank in the Marine Corp, and he had a picture of Rommel in his tank. Maybe he should have had a picture of Monash as well.
Erimitus On July 01, 2021




The mind of God, Antarctica
#99New Post! Sep 04, 2018 @ 21:09:00
@chaski Said

GREATEST WAR EVER!



OH Yeah! When that nice President Trump has his war it will be the greatest war ever. He would fight in it himself if it wasn't for his bone spurs.
chaski On April 19, 2024
Stalker





Tree at Floydgirrl's Window,
#100New Post! Sep 04, 2018 @ 21:15:47
@Erimitus Said

OH Yeah! When that nice President Trump has his war it will be the greatest war ever. He would fight in it himself if it wasn't for his bone spurs.


He would run into battle even without a weapon! Greatest Warrior President EVER!
newcarscent7 On March 18, 2020




Cleveland, Ohio
#101New Post! Sep 05, 2018 @ 15:36:17
@Erimitus Said

OH Yeah! When that nice President Trump has his war it will be the greatest war ever. He would fight in it himself if it wasn't for his bone spurs.



He can't fight, but he WILL pace around you and make you nervous!
shadowen On March 22, 2024




Bunyip Bend, Australia
#102New Post! Sep 05, 2018 @ 15:48:37
@Ghyda Said

A man I know says that he commanded a tank in the Marine Corp, and he had a picture of Rommel in his tank. Maybe he should have had a picture of Monash as well.


In the First World War most senior officers in the French and British armies had been cavalry officers and they viewed tanks as mobile artillery. Monash on the other hand saw tanks as the natural successors of cavalry (a very unpopular view).

Monash is generally regarded as the first commander of World War One to fully integrate infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft into a combined-arms doctrine. Post 1918 a number of British officers (impressed by what Monash and his Australians had achieved at Hamel and Amiens) published some very influential works on modern warfare. These included Liddell Hart, Percy Hobart, Giffard Martel and John Fuller. Infact Fuller's principles of war were adopted by the US army in 1921, and formed the basis of advanced training for officers into the 1990s.

How much people like Monash, Hart, Hobart, Martel and Fuller influenced German officers like Guderian between the wars is a matter of some debate. What we do know is that Guderian studied the operations of Monash and the writings of the British officers mentioned above.

As an aside the success of the battles of Hamel and Amiens formed the basis of the British Armies Field Service Regulations published after 1918 that focused on combined-arms operations.

In France Charles de Gaulle was a strong advocate (in the 1930's) of the concentration of armour and aeroplanes. His views however were very much at odds with his superiors.

Back on Monash and he is regarded by many as the 'father' of modern armored combined-arms doctrine whilst Guderian is viewed as the 'father' of 'blitzkrieg'.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For me 5 of the top armoured commanders of the second world war would be:
- Heinz Guderian
- Erich von Manstein
- Erwin Rommel
- Georgy Zhukov and
- Stanislaw Maczek
Erimitus On July 01, 2021




The mind of God, Antarctica
#103New Post! Sep 05, 2018 @ 20:37:40
@newcarscent7 Said

He can't fight, but he WILL pace around you and make you nervous!



chuckle
Erimitus On July 01, 2021




The mind of God, Antarctica
#104New Post! Sep 05, 2018 @ 20:40:19
@shadowen Said

In the First World War most senior officers in the French and British armies had been cavalry officers and they viewed tanks as mobile artillery. Monash on the other hand saw tanks as the natural successors of cavalry (a very unpopular view).

Monash is generally regarded as the first commander of World War One to fully integrate infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft into a combined-arms doctrine. Post 1918 a number of British officers (impressed by what Monash and his Australians had achieved at Hamel and Amiens) published some very influential works on modern warfare. These included Liddell Hart, Percy Hobart, Giffard Martel and John Fuller. Infact Fuller's principles of war were adopted by the US army in 1921, and formed the basis of advanced training for officers into the 1990s.

How much people like Monash, Hart, Hobart, Martel and Fuller influenced German officers like Guderian between the wars is a matter of some debate. What we do know is that Guderian studied the operations of Monash and the writings of the British officers mentioned above.

As an aside the success of the battles of Hamel and Amiens formed the basis of the British Armies Field Service Regulations published after 1918 that focused on combined-arms operations.

In France Charles de Gaulle was a strong advocate (in the 1930's) of the concentration of armour and aeroplanes. His views however were very much at odds with his superiors.

Back on Monash and he is regarded by many as the 'father' of modern armored combined-arms doctrine whilst Guderian is viewed as the 'father' of 'blitzkrieg'.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For me 5 of the top armoured commanders of the second world war would be:
- Heinz Guderian
- Erich von Manstein
- Erwin Rommel
- Georgy Zhukov and
- Stanislaw Maczek



Patton?
shadowen On March 22, 2024




Bunyip Bend, Australia
#105New Post! Sep 06, 2018 @ 12:10:38
It is difficult to judge Patton as he always had very significant advantages over his enemies. In his battles against the Germans he enjoyed (near, or) complete air superiority which was massively important. He also enjoyed significant advantages in men, tanks, artillery, ammunition, fuel and general supplies.

His performances in North Africa were generally poor and in Sicily inconsistent. During the Lorraine campaign - and esp at Metz - his limitations as a commander were exposed.

For me, when judging the performance of a commander of armoured troops you look primarily at three areas. Those being how well they are able to:
- exploit advantages, identify opportunities and advance quickly into enemy held territory
- overcome a strong defensive position and
- withdrawal in fighting order when the odds are heavily stacked against you and mount strong defensive actions.

Of the above Patton only did the first one. He failed (like at Metz) to do the second and never had to worry about the third.

Now I am not saying that Patton was a poor commander. The vast majority of times he had very significant advantages over his enemy and his, at times reckless, daring often meant that he was able to exploit the advantages that he had. But neither he nor any US commander (or troops) faced the Germans when they were anywhere near at their strongest. On the other hand commanders like Heinz Guderian, Erich von Manstein, Erwin Rommel, Georgy Zhukov and Stanislaw Maczek proved themselves in the three areas I mentioned above.
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